Social Effects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976

Name

Institution

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**Introduction**

The 1966-1976 Chinese Cultural Revolution pertains to a primeval disaster that was initiated by the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong (Yongyi, 2011). Yongyi, (2011) asserts that this tragedy led to the demise of numerous people and also imposed harsh and ruthless handlings on other many persons. Essentially, Mao commenced this upheaval in August 1966, which instigated the closure of schools nationally. Consequently, he ordered a huge recruitment of young persons to admonish the existing heads of coalitions, due to their incorporation of conformist morals, along with the failure to possess an insurgent attitude. Afterwards, the sect escalated rapidly as the scholars created revolutionary units, which were named the *Red Guards*, and confronted and bullied the associates of the aging and educated populace in China (History.com Editors, 2020).

As a result, this led to the speedy materialization of a disposition enthusiasm surrounding Mao, which was comparable to Josef Stalin’s personality cult, with diverse groups of the crusade demanding the actual explanation of the Marxist philosophy. More specifically, members of the movement urged the Chinese inhabitants to free themselves of the traditions, beliefs, customs, and concepts from the past (History.com Editors, 2020). All the same, this uprising formally culminated on September 1976, following Mao’s demise (Phillips, 2016). Hence, the problem statement is whether such a powerful communal turmoil merely damaged the social order, or it also hindered the innovation and growth of China’s financial system. As such, this paper analyzes the social effects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, on the republic of China.

**Body Paragraphs**

To begin with, Meng, et al. (2002) contends that the Cultural Revolution caused one of the biggest interruptions to the typical process of education, in which nearly all the learning institutions in China’s municipality terminated their normal systems for around 6 years. Furthermore, the regular enrollment of undergraduates in establishments of higher education discontinued for a yet extensive time frame. For that reason, an entire peer group of youths went through an interrupted structure of certified edification. Theoretically, the three different consequences of this disruption included skipped years of learning, conclusion of college years devoid of usual programs, and the deferment of university admissions past the regular stage. Accordingly, this means that the Cultural Revolution was extremely detrimental on the scholastic scheme of China, which was perceived to eradicate the existing communal and financial disparities between the intellectuals and informed groups, and employees and laborers.

Moreover, WU (2015) notes that the Cultural Revolution also had considerable consequences on the financial growth, system of amassing human assets, governmental configuration, in addition to the traditions and morals of China. Initially, in connection with fiscal enactment, the upheaval led to a substantial damage of China’s monetary expansion. Here, recent studies show that the country experienced an adverse progression for 3 years throughout the disruption decade, followed by 2 years that possessed development proportions below 4%. Besides, the disrupted structures of learning during the insurgence period prompted the youths to take part in the radical campaigns, strenuous labor and rebellious undertakings as opposed to remaining in school, thereby causing an enormous shortfall of human resources. Concerning the civil scheme, the regime, civic safety and law courts faced incongruities that persisted for long periods of time. Lastly, most ancient and ethnic artifacts were wrecked during the crusade that aimed at demolishing the archaic ways of life, customs and notions.

Further, Lieberthal (2020) posits that the occasioning fraud and bribery in the CPP and regime characterized as an additional grave social effect of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In particular, this effect resulted from both the fears brought about by the upheaval and the shortage of commodities that went along with it. In turn, this compelled the public to resort to old-style individual associations, as well as on corruption and other types of incentives, in order to achieve their aspirations. Concurrently, the revolution also resulted to an overall cynicism with the people in charge of the CPP, along with the general governmental structure of China. Ideally, this occurred after masses of Chinese from municipal places observed the evident authority dramas that ensued beneath the title of radical code, during the first and middle parts of the 1970s. At the same time, there was an extensive vicious factionalism, given that associates of competing groups of the revolution split equivalent labor divisions, both seeking to destabilize each other’s powers. In general, the after Mao rejection of the goals and outcomes of the social insurgency compelled a lot of persons to disregard political affairs in total.

Ultimately, Wang (2017) asserts that in relation to the present times, the upheaval possesses an incessant consequence on the governmental confidence in China even now, nearly 50 years afterwards. More specifically, recent reviews illustrate that the participants who matured in regions that went through extra antagonism between 1966 and 1971 tend to have low faith in their civil directors at all ranks, presently. More specifically, an additional demise in every 1,000 individuals within the upheaval decade results to about a 3.7%, 4.4%, 4.2%, and 4.4% reduced reliance in public, municipal, regional and central frontrunners, respectively. For this reason, it is clear that the brutality openly influenced the groups that existed prior to the upheaval, and implicitly swayed those that came later, which signifies the communication of governmental insolences amongst generations. Moreover, contact with aggression has also been shown to affect all kinds of people, irrespective of if they categorized as casualties, agents, or spectators of the Cultural Revolution.

**Counter Arguments**

According to Wang, et al. (2013) recent inferences propose that the stated interruption of educational systems in the course of the upheaval led to a clear decrease in the occurrence and spreading of myopia, also referred to as shortsightedness, which pertains to an eye disorder that is capable of causing blindness. Fundamentally, the magnitude of the importance of the ailment has significantly increased in China, from when its pervasiveness intensely rose amongst the youths. Put differently, this means that the prevalence of myopia has affected the attainment of education amongst the young Chinese generations. However, this argument contrasts the previous claims that state that China boasts a solid household reliance influence that connects the scholastic achievement of a single generation to another.

In other words, this means that the asserted reduction of myopia is quite insignificant in relation to the havoc that the revolution caused. Specifically, Meng, et al. (2002) assert that in the case that the revolution did not take place, the estimated ratio of the attainment of university degrees for those with maternal figures having complete studies up to the lower high school level is at around 33% of those whose mothers went beyond advanced high school. In addition to this, Meng also notes that comparable consequences are evident when the occurrence of achieving success in the university level is categorized by the academic rank of the paternal figure, along with the professional position of both parents.

On the other hand, Pye (1986) contends that although the Cultural Revolution had at first led to an eruption of resentments amid the governmental and scholarly leaders at the beginning of the upheaval, it also ultimately established unity amongst both elites. In essence, this harmony mainly originated from the basis of the mutual aggression towards the revolution’s political impartiality. In other words, this means that the Cultural Revolution finally created a consensus between the political and academic elites in China. Nevertheless, Andreas (2002) argues that following Mao’s induction of the revolution in 1966, the regulation of the CPP was thwarted, which consequently caused the rapid development of competing groups in all Chinese learning institutions and places of work. Consequently, this conflict between the groups offered an exceptional opening into inconsistencies in the communal structures that developed after collectivist uprisings.

Specifically, these revolutions were stimulated by a governmental debate that concentrated on authority and prospect within the new communist groups. According to Andreas (2002), the established justification of these group skirmishes emphasized the conflict amid the youngsters of both the academic and partisan leaders. Particularly, the children belonging to the governmental frontrunners assaulted the country’s social assets and safeguarded radical assets on one hand, whereas the scholarly elites’ children battered governmental assets and protected ethnic resources, on the other. Therefore, this means that China kept on being extensively differentiated into the two domestic derivation sites projected by the contending paradigm of the elites. In turn, this contradicts the notion that Cultural Revolution ultimately generated a consensus between the political and scholarly elites in China.

**Conclusion**

This paper analyzed the social effects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, on the republic of China. Specifically, the essay aimed at illustrating if this extremely influential public chaos only destroyed the order of the community, or it also delayed the modernization and evolution of the fiscal structure of the country. In light of this discussion, it is correct to say that all Chinese establishments, ranging from the household, learning, political party and the existing regime, were all intensely influenced by the revolution. For instance, there existed a critical peer group inequality on people who underwent the upheaval during their teenage years and initial twenties, where they were deprived of a complete formal edification and trained to rectify complaints through protests, as depicted.

Similarly, the rules created after the Cultural Revolution, especially those that put emphasis on learning and programs in contradiction of the enthusiasm towards political insurgency, made it almost impossible for most of the persons in the generational gap to possess prolific professions, as illustrated. Consequently, the chaos caused by the societal, political and scholarly disruptions created a huge gap, not only in the generations and elites, but also in the overall administrative system of China. Accordingly, it is evident that the Chinese Cultural Revolution was generally a period of unexploited years, which apart from violence and sadness comprised lack of faith in political and cultural systems, alteration of data, disloyalty of morals, and degradation, to mention but a few.

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